Meaning of a Global Perspective

The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) published a thematic report on the digital age challenges to inclusion and public debate, focusing specifically on digital literacy and content moderation processes. Premised on the international human rights principles, the report offers normative guidance – in essence, a content governance framework – to states and other relevant actors “​​in promoting an internet that is truly accessible to all persons, without discrimination.” The report concludes with a list of recommendations, one of which urges states to adopt policies that tackle “hate speech or disinformation coming from public figures” but warns that “[s]uch policies should be aligned with international human rights standards, especially the three-part test of legality, legitimate aim, and necessity and proportionality.”

“In this essay, Professor Balkin argues that digital technologies alter the social conditions of speech and therefore should change the focus of free speech theory, from a Meiklejohnian or republican concern with protecting democratic process and democratic deliberation, to a larger concern with protecting and promoting a democratic culture. A democratic culture is a culture in which individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning-making that constitute them as individuals. Democratic culture is about individual liberty as well as collective self-governance; it concerns each individual’s ability to participate in the production and distribution of culture. Balkin argues that Meiklejohn and his followers were influenced by the social conditions of speech produced by the rise of mass media in the twentieth century, in which only a relative few could broadcast to large numbers of people. Republican or progressivist theories of free speech also tend to downplay the importance of nonpolitical expression, popular culture, and individual liberty. The limitations of this approach have become increasingly apparent in the age of the Internet. By changing the social conditions of speech, digital technologies lead to new social conflicts over the ownership and control of informational capital. The free speech principle is the battleground over many of these conflicts. For example, media companies have interpreted the free speech principle broadly to combat regulation of digital networks and narrowly in order to protect and extend their intellectual property rights. The digital age greatly expands the possibilities for individual participation in the growth and spread of culture, and thus greatly expands the possibilities for the realization of a truly democratic culture. But the same technologies also produce new methods of control that can limit democratic cultural participation. Therefore, free speech values – interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and transform culture – must be protected through technological design and through administrative and legislative regulation of technology, as well as through the more traditional method of judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights. Increasingly, freedom of speech will depend on the design of the technological infrastructure that supports the system of free expression and secures widespread democratic participation. Institutional limitations of courts will prevent them from reaching the most important questions about how that infrastructure is designed and implemented. Safeguarding freedom of speech will thus increasingly fall to legislatures, administrative agencies, and technologists.”

The article, published by Media Defence, reviews some of the written submissions – third-party interventions and expert opinions – that the organization filed before domestic courts in 2024, striving to foster press freedom at national levels. The list of countries includes Albania, Angola, Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, and Thailand. The cases vary in the issues considered: Media Defence filed arguments on source confidentiality, sedition laws, satire, incitement, restriction of information access, artistic expression, respect for private life, data protection, and surveillance.

How can media freedom literacy (MFL) be strengthened in the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)? Establishing the not-so-often-emphasized connection between media literacy and media freedom, this report, commissioned by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM), offers practical tools for government bodies, scholars, media organizations, civil society, and digital platforms. Chapter 4 defines and explains MFL, while Chapter 5 reviews key legislative and regulatory frameworks at international and national levels, including the European Media Freedom Act and Digital Services Act, among others, and approaches developed in Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, UK, US, and Canada. Chapter 7, a broader review of MFL projects and interventions, is followed by recommendations to various stakeholders and case studies of projects that promote MFL.

"This article examines the process of consensus formation by the international community on how to confront the problem of trafficking in persons. We analyze the corpus of UNGA Third Committee resolutions to show that (1) consensus around the issue of how to confront trafficking in persons has increased over time; and (2) the formation of this consensus depends on how the issue is framed. We test our argument by examining the characteristics of resolutions’ sponsors and discursive framing concepts such as crime, human rights, and the strength of enforcement language. We conclude that the consensus formation process in international relations is more aptly described as one of “accommodation” through issue linkage than a process of persuasion."

“While autonomy arguments provide a compelling foundation for free speech, they also support individual privacy rights. Considering how speech and privacy may be justified, the article argues that the speech necessary for self-government does not need to include details that would violate privacy rights. Additionally, it argues that if viewed as a kind of intangible property right, informational privacy should limit speech and expression in a range of cases. In a world where we have an overabundance of content to consume, much of which could be called “information pollution,” and where there are numerous platforms to broadcast one’s expressions, it is increasingly difficult to maintain that speech should trump privacy.”

For the thirteenth year in a row, there has been a drop in internet freedom worldwide, with digital repression causing the largest decline in Iran. Myanmar was found to have the worst internet freedom conditions in the world, while President Rodrigo Duterte's use of an antiterrorism statute to restrict news sites critical of his administration made matters worse in the Philippines. After a presidential candidate whose campaign manager employed internet trolls to intimidate media outlets was elected, Costa Rica's reputation as a champion of internet freedom came under danger. Attacks on the right to free speech have become more widespread; out of the 70 nations that Freedom on the Net covers, 55 have reported facing legal consequences for online speech, and 41 have executed or killed individuals for their comments posted online.

With 47 governments using commenters to sway online debates, generative artificial intelligence (AI) poses a serious challenge to online disinformation tactics. Disinformation strategies have intensified as a result of the increased sophistication, accessibility, and ease of use of AI-based technologies. Governments have also improved and honed their online censorship strategies; in 22 countries, laws have been passed requiring or rewarding digital companies to use machine learning to filter out objectionable social, political, and religious content.

The defenders of democracy must apply the lessons they have learnt from previous internet governance issues to AI to preserve online freedom. AI has the potential to be a powerful tool for digital repression, increasing the efficiency, speed, cost-effectiveness, and ease of censorship, surveillance, and the production and dissemination of false information.

"The dynamics by which norms emerge and spread in international society have been the subject of strikingly little study. This article focuses on norms that prohibit, both in international law and in the domestic criminal laws of states, the involvement of state and nonstate actors in activities such as piracy, slavery, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, the hijacking of aircraft, and the killing of endangered animal species. It analyzes the manner in which these norms have evolved into and been institutionalized by global prohibition regimes and argues that there are two principal inducements to the formation and promotion of such regimes. The first is the inadequacy of unilateral and bilateral law enforcement measures in the face of criminal activities that transcend national borders. The second is the role of moral and emotional factors related to neither political nor economic advantage but instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, fears, prejudices, paternalism, faith in universalism, the individual conscience, and the compulsion to proselytize. The ultimate success or failure of an international regime in effectively suppressing a particular activity depends, however, not only on the degree of commitment to its norms or the extent of resources devoted to carrying out its goals but also on the vulnerability of the activity to its enforcement measures."

Modern liberal-democratic nations are divided over whether the right to freedom of expression should extend to hate speech, which abuses, degrades, or promotes violence or discrimination against others based on traits like race, nationality, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Most liberal democracies outlaw certain forms of public hate speech in order to protect the dignity, equality, and security of the targeted groups. At the same time, the United States rejects this position and holds that public hate speech generally should receive constitutional protection.

This essay argues that bans on public and private hate speech can contradict liberal principles. It focuses on the writings of John Locke, which laid the theoretical foundations of the modern liberal state and addressed the problem of speech that denies the equal status and rights of others. Locke's thought offers a valuable starting point for considering how liberal principles should apply to hate speech.

This essay presents a theory of free expression based on liberal humanism, which argues that free speech is based on respect for human freedom and dignity, but does not entitle one to infringe on the rights of others. It uses this approach to grapple with the problem of hate speech, which may be restricted on the grounds that it violates the most basic right of all: the right to be recognized and treated as a human being and a member of the community. Locke argued that expression that sought to deny freedom and equality to religious minorities should not receive legal protection because it invaded its targets' rights and undermined society's foundations. The essay also responds to two of the leading liberal arguments against hate-speech bans: that they violate individual autonomy and undermine democratic legitimacy.

“The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, ‘limit’ the freedom of expression on certain grounds, such as national security, public order, public health, and public morals. Examples from around the world show that the freedom of individuals to express their opinions, convictions, and beliefs is often imperilled when states are not required to meet a substantial justificatory burden when limiting such freedom. This article critiques one of the common justificatory approaches employed in a number of jurisdictions to frame the state’s burden to justify limitations on the freedom of expression—the proportionality test. It presents a case for an alternative approach that builds on the merits and addresses some of the weaknesses of a typical proportionality test. This alternative may be called a ‘duty-based’ justificatory approach because it requires the state to demonstrate—through the presentation of publicly justifiable reasons—that the individual concerned owes others a duty of justice to refrain from the expressive conduct in question. The article explains how this approach is more normatively compelling than a typical proportionality test. It also illustrates how such an approach can better constrain the state’s ability to advance majoritarian interests or offload its positive obligations by limiting the freedom of expression of minorities and dissenting voices.”