“This Article will start from the premises and proposals of [extant scholarship]. Through developing, modifying, and supplementing [these] theories, as well as taking into account the new speech conditions in the Internet Age, this Article aims to develop systematically, though not completely, the theoretical basis and practical implications of the freedom of speech as a right to know. The relationship between the two rights is not unidirectional: not only could the freedom of speech form the basis for the right to know, but also the right to know could enrich the doctrine of the freedom of speech. The characteristics of the right to know could make the freedom of speech more direct, more practical, and more enforceable. We should accordingly interpret the freedom of speech as a right to know. This Article’s thesis does not necessarily require the right to know to be expressly written into the Constitution (although this is one reasonable approach), nor does it contend that freedom of speech is the only basis for the right to know. Rather, this Article reformulates the theory of free speech through the module of the right to know. Having done that, the right to know will, in effect, be constitutionalized because it will become a part of the freedom of speech. What’s more important is the impact on our current free speech jurisprudence: using information as both a shield and a sword, this new and reformulated right will better respond to the age we are in where speech is information, information is power, and the liberty of speech is the freedom and control of information.”
Huang, Tao. “Freedom of Speech as a Right to Know”. University of Cincinnati Law Review 89, no. 1 (2020): 106-139.