Freedom of Expression Online

In this segment of the MOOC 'International and African Legal Framework on Freedom of Expression, Access to Information and the Safety of Journalists' developed by the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria with the support of UNESCO, professor Guy Berger talks about the internet and access to information.

This segment is part of Module 4 of the MOOC: The right of access to information in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and African standards.

“In the first-ever UN report that examines the regulation of user-generated online content, the Special Rapporteur examines the role of States and social media companies in providing an enabling environment for freedom of expression and access to information online. In the face of contemporary threats such as “fake news” and disinformation and online extremism, the Special Rapporteur urges States to reconsider speech-based restrictions and adopt smart regulation targeted at enabling the public to make choices about how and whether to engage in online fora. The Special Rapporteur also conducts an in-depth investigation of how Internet Companies moderate content on major social media platforms, and argues that human rights law gives companies the tools to articulate their positions in ways that respect democratic norms and counter authoritarian demands.”

“Threats to digital expression and Internet freedom are more pronounced than ever. Internet shutdowns have emerged as a popular means of information control. Government surveillance continues to intensify worldwide, jeopardizing the privacy and security of millions. Net neutrality – the long-held premise that all Internet data should be treated equally and without undue interference – has come under attack. In this increasingly hostile environment, what are the human rights responsibilities of the Information, Communications and Technology sector – particularly those actors that facilitate the provision of telecommunications and Internet access, and serve as gatekeepers of the digital infrastructure? To address this question, the Special Rapporteur first examines the role of States in undermining freedom of expression online, and what their obligation to protect this fundamental right entails. The Special Rapporteur subsequently evaluates the role of digital access providers – not just telecommunications companies and Internet service providers, which have become synonymous with digital access, but also non-consumer facing actors like network equipment vendors, content delivery networks, and Internet exchange points. Drawing on the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and best practices in the field, the Special Rapporteur proposes concrete steps that digital access providers should take to safeguard the freedom of expression of Internet users worldwide.”

The report (A/HRC/4/27) is divided in three chapters. Chapter III addresses, among others, "future establishment of an intergovernmental body dealing with Internet governance and its role in limiting commercial pressure on, inter alia, a human rights approach to Internet freedom. The Special Rapporteur also addresses the necessity of swift action from Governments and Parliaments in order to decriminalize defamation and related offences. Finally, the Special Rapporteur examines the most recent initiatives with regard to security and protection of journalists and media professionals, and their repercussion on the availability of independent information and opinion-making. In addition to the proposed study on this matter, the Special Rapporteur also launches the idea of a voluntary fund to provide financial relief to the families of journalists killed while performing their duties or because of their activities, especially in developing countries” 

“Online disinformation is considered a major challenge for modern democracies. It is widely understood as misleading content produced to generate profits, pursue political goals, or maliciously deceive. Our starting point is the assumption that some countries are more resilient to online disinformation than others. To understand what conditions influence this resilience, we choose a comparative cross-national approach. In the first step, we develop a theoretical framework that presents these country conditions as theoretical dimensions. In the second step, we translate the dimensions into quantifiable indicators that allow us to measure their significance on a comparative cross-country basis. In the third part of the study, we empirically examine eighteen Western democracies. A cluster analysis yields three country groups: one group with high resilience to online disinformation (including the Northern European systems, for instance) and two country groups with low resilience (including the polarized Southern European countries and the United States). In the final part, we discuss the heuristic value of the framework for comparative political communication research in the age of information pollution.”

“For the first time in human history, ordinary people have been given the ability to publicly share and access information instantly and globally through social media, without the mediation of traditional gatekeepers such as newspaper editors or government censors. Yet, the growth of social media has made even democracies wary of the resulting impact on the global ecosystem of news, opinion, and information. Unmediated and instant access to the global digital sphere has gone hand in hand with the amplification and global dissemination of harms, including online extremism and disinformation. With the entry into force of the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) in 2017, Germany became the first country in the world to require online platforms with more than 2 million users in their country to remove “manifestly illegal” content within a time period of 24 hours. Since the adoption of the NetzDG, more than 20 States around the world – including France – have adopted similar laws imposing “intermediary liability” on social media platforms. While democracies impose intermediary liability to counter online harms, ‘outsourcing’ government mandated content regulation to private actors raises serious questions about the consequences on online freedom of expression. The objective of this report is a preliminary and indicative attempt to sketch the duration of national legal proceedings in hate speech cases in selected Council of Europe States. The length of domestic criminal proceedings is then compared with the timeframe within which some governments require platforms to decide and take down hate speech under laws such as the NetzDG. Due to the nature of the relevant data, the following comparison between national criminal proceedings and time limits under government mandated notice and take down regimes is merely indicative and preliminary. Nevertheless, it is hoped that it may contribute to answering the question of how to develop time limits that are consistent with a meaningful assessment of the free speech interests of users of large social media platforms. A question essential to the future of online free speech.”

Published by Masaar, a community of lawyers and technologists advancing digital rights in Egypt, the article explains “the Fediverse” as a challenge to the concentration of Internet power in the hands of few tech companies. Two core ideas build the Fediverse: 1) decentralization and 2) federalism. The article dives into those and gives an overview of the Fediverse’s technological foundation, its philosophy, objectives, first application and evolution. The article also lists some of the networks currently running - Mastodon, PeerTube, Diaspora, and Pixelfed - and discusses the Fediverse’s future along with the challenges it entails, such as difficulty in attracting users, lack of sustainability guarantees, and security threats. The paper concludes on an optimistic note, encouraging Internet users to try a Fediverse application: “Building a free Internet is the only way for it to support its users’ rights and freedoms. Thus, tools like the Fediverse are very important for the future of the Internet and accordingly for the future of us all.”

The exponential increase of Internet connectivity in China has generated a great deal of journalistic and scholarly work that has essentially documented the emergence of the Internet as an unprecedented, though censored, platform for public expression, and has assessed its political significance. Much attention has been paid to information control exercised by the Chinese government, notably in the form of the filtering system known as the Great Firewall, and of regulations forcing social network platforms to censor contents, as well as to the determinants of self-censorship on the users’ side. Much less is known, however, about the more diversified forms of power that are embedded in Internet governance, broadly conceived as the incremental conception, implementation, regulation, management, and uses of Internet networks and services. This issue focuses on a) the reliance of the Chinese government’s information control and propaganda on institutional arrangements and on the design of web platforms, b) analysis of the impact of Internet technical infrastructures and standards on the definition of a “Chinese” Internet and its implications for the strategic interests of the Chinese government.

In this segment of the MOOC created by Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, Tais Gasparian explains the Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for Internet Use. In June 2014, Law 12,965 came into force, which established principles and guarantees and rights for internet use in Brazil. Due to its significance, it was called the Civil Rights Framework for Internet Use, and it aims to secure rights and liabilities in regard to use of digital media. Basically, this law is characterized as being legislation that guarantees rights, and that does not restrict freedoms.

The report, published by ARTICLE 19, interrogates digital influence in Cambodia, Malaysia, Nepal, and Thailand. As China broadens the scope of its technology and partnerships in normalizing the “authoritarian approach to digital governance,” the study sets out to understand China’s digital superpower aspirations by unpacking its regional strategies. “This report shows that dual infrastructure and policy support from China, in the hands of authoritarian states, has contributed to increasing restrictions on freedom of expression and information, the right to privacy, and other acts of digital repression,” Michael Caster, ARTICLE 19’s Asia Digital Program Manager, comments. Defining the Digital Silk Road as an umbrella term for digital policies that are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the report explains China’s domestic digital landscape, outlines the evolution of the country’s domestic and foreign digital policies, and offers case studies on the digital infrastructure and governance in each of the four focus countries. The report concludes with recommendations to governments, the internet freedom community, and the private tech sector.